Domino -teorie

Domino -teorie


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Die domino -teorie was 'n Koue Oorlog -beleid wat daarop dui dat 'n kommunistiese regering in een land vinnig tot kommunistiese oorname in buurstate sou lei, wat elkeen sou val soos 'n perfek in lyn gebringde domino's. In Suidoos-Asië het die Amerikaanse regering die nou-gediskrediteerde domino-teorie gebruik om sy betrokkenheid by die Viëtnam-oorlog en sy steun vir 'n nie-kommunistiese diktator in Suid-Viëtnam te regverdig. Die Amerikaanse versuim om 'n kommunistiese oorwinning in Viëtnam te voorkom, het in werklikheid veel minder invloed gehad as wat die voorstanders van die domino -teorie aanvaar het. Met die uitsondering van Laos en Kambodja, het kommunisme nie in Suidoos -Asië versprei nie.

Noord- en Suid -Viëtnam

In September 1945 kondig die Viëtnamese nasionalistiese leier Ho Chi Minh die onafhanklikheid van Viëtnam uit Frankryk aan, met 'n oorlog wat Ho se kommunistiese Viet Minh-regime in Hanoi (Noord-Viëtnam) teen 'n Frans-gesteunde regime in Saigon (Suid-Viëtnam) begin het.

Onder president Harry Truman het die Amerikaanse regering geheime militêre en finansiële hulp aan die Franse verleen; die rede was dat 'n kommunistiese oorwinning in Indochina die verspreiding van kommunisme in Suidoos -Asië sou laat neerkom. Deur dieselfde logika te gebruik, sou Truman ook aan die einde van die veertigerjare hulp verleen aan Griekeland en Turkye om kommunisme in Europa en die Midde -Ooste te bekamp.

Wat is die Domino -teorie?

Teen 1950 het die makers van die Amerikaanse buitelandse beleid die idee vasgehou dat die val van Indochina op kommunisme vinnig sou lei tot die ineenstorting van ander lande in Suidoos -Asië. Die Nasionale Veiligheidsraad het die teorie ingesluit in 'n verslag van 1952 oor Indochina, en in April 1954, tydens die beslissende stryd tussen Viet Minh en die Franse magte by Dien Bien Phu, het president Dwight D. Eisenhower dit verwoord as die 'valse domino' -beginsel.

Volgens Eisenhower sou die verlies van Viëtnam aan kommunistiese beheer lei tot soortgelyke kommunistiese oorwinnings in buurlande in Suidoos -Asië (insluitend Laos, Kambodja en Thailand) en elders (Indië, Japan, die Filippyne, Indonesië en selfs Australië en Nieu -Seeland) . "Die moontlike gevolge van die verlies [van Indochina]," het Eisenhower gesê, "is vir die vrye wêreld net onberekenbaar."

Na die toespraak van Eisenhower, het die frase "domino -teorie" begin word as 'n afkorting van die strategiese belangrikheid van Suid -Viëtnam vir die Verenigde State, sowel as die behoefte om die verspreiding van kommunisme oor die hele wêreld te beperk.

Amerikaanse betrokkenheid by Viëtnam verdiep

Nadat die Genève-konferensie die Frans-Viet Minh-oorlog beëindig en Viëtnam verdeel het op die breedtegraad wat bekend staan ​​as die 17de parallel, het die Verenigde State aan die spits gestaan ​​van die organisasie van die Suidoos-Asië-verdragsorganisasie (SEATO), 'n los alliansie van nasies wat daartoe verbind is om aksie te neem teen ' veiligheidsbedreigings ”in die streek.

John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower se opvolger in die Withuis, sou die toewyding van Amerikaanse hulpbronne verhoog ter ondersteuning van die Ngo Dinh Diem-regime in Suid-Viëtnam en nie-kommunistiese magte wat 'n burgeroorlog in Laos in 1961-62 voer. In die herfs van 1963, nadat daar 'n ernstige huishoudelike teenkanting teen Diem was, het Kennedy hom van die steun van Diem self teruggehou, maar in die openbaar die geloof in die domino -teorie en die belangrikheid daarvan om kommunisme in Suidoos -Asië te bevat, bevestig.

Drie weke nadat Diem vroeg in November 1963 tydens 'n militêre staatsgreep vermoor is, is Kennedy in Dallas vermoor; sy opvolger Lyndon B. Johnson sou voortgaan om die domino -teorie te gebruik om die eskalasie van die Amerikaanse militêre teenwoordigheid in Viëtnam van 'n paar duisend soldate na meer as 500,000 in die volgende vyf jaar te regverdig.

Nasies is nie domino's nie

Die domino -teorie word nou grotendeels in diskrediet gebring, aangesien dit nie die karakter van die Noord -Viëtnamese en Viëtkong -stryd in die Viëtnam -oorlog in ag geneem het nie.

Deur aan te neem dat Ho Chi Minh 'n pion van die kommunistiese reuse Rusland en China was, het Amerikaanse beleidmakers nie besef dat Ho en sy ondersteuners die doel was om Vietnamese onafhanklikheid te wees nie die verspreiding van kommunisme nie.

Uiteindelik, hoewel die Amerikaanse poging om 'n kommunistiese oorname te blokkeer, misluk het en Noord -Viëtnamese magte in 1975 na Saigon opgeruk het, het die kommunisme nie in die res van Suidoos -Asië versprei nie. Met die uitsondering van Laos en Kambodja, het die nasies van die streek buite kommunistiese beheer gebly.


'N Oorsig van die opstel van die geskiedenis van die Domino -teorie

Vrywaring: Hierdie werk is deur 'n universiteitstudent ingedien.

Enige menings, bevindings, gevolgtrekkings of aanbevelings wat in hierdie materiaal uitgespreek word, is dié van die outeurs en weerspieël nie noodwendig die standpunte van AUEssays.com nie.

Domino Theory, 'n komplekse en interessante teorie, is gebaseer op 'n eenvoudige fisiese reël. Die reël is traagheid. Traagheid is die neiging van materie om in rus te bly of in 'n vaste rigting voort te gaan, tensy dit deur 'n mate van buite beïnvloed word. 'N Voorbeeld vir Domino Theory sou wees om 'n reeks domino's te maak en dan die eerste domino om te druk, terwyl elke domino val, sal 'n ander volg totdat elke domino uiteindelik geval het.

Viper is 'n vinnige en maklike manier om u werk op plagiaat te kontroleer. Die aanlyn -skanderingstelsel pas binne enkele sekondes by u werk teen meer as 5 miljard aanlynbronne.

Namate die proses voortgaan, sal die domino's momentum kry. Hierdie analogie toon aan wat met die politieke samestelling van 'n spesifieke geografiese gebied kan gebeur as een van die dominante politieke denkpatrone versprei word. Die dominante politieke denkpatroon wat oorspronklik tot hierdie teorie gelei het, was kommunisme. Dit wil sê dat as een land in 'n streek 'n bepaalde tipe regering beoefen, dit buurlande kan beïnvloed om hierdie tipe regering aan te neem. Alhoewel die proses agter Domino Theory tegnies sedert die aanbreek van die mensdom plaasgevind het, was dit tot 1954 nie deur die destydse president Dwight D. Eisenhower deur 'n spesifieke titel geklassifiseer nie. Eisenhower het hierdie teorie gebruik om te verduidelik wat volgens hom 'n uitstekende verspreiding van kommunisme in Suidoos-Asië was. Hy het gesê dat jy 'n ry domino's opgestel het, jy slaan die eerste een om, en wat met die laaste een sal gebeur, is dat dit baie vinnig sal val. Hy het geglo, soos baie ander destyds, dat as een land in Suidoos-Asië onder die kommunisme val, sou die omliggende lande een vir een val. Hy was diep ontsteld oor die manier waarop die kommunisme Oos -Europa ná die Tweede Wêreldoorlog aangeneem het en die manier waarop Asië so maklik deur Japan oorgeneem is. Deur hierdie vrees het hy die potensiaal gesien vir 'n herhaling van die geskiedenis in Suidoos-Asië gedurende die laat 50's tot die 70's. 'N Sekere situasie waarop die Domino -teorie toegepas kan word, is die toename in mag van die Sowjetunie van 1917 tot die 1980's. Die Sowjetunie het gedurende hierdie tydperk die mag gekry deur grond of hele lande met geweld onder ander regerings uit te neem. Hierdie situasie het nie net die Domino -teorie ondersteun nie, maar het ook 'n sosialistiese neiging tot wêreldoorheersing getoon. Die tekens van hierdie neiging kan op baie plekke gevind word, insluitend Nations and Men, 'n International Politics and Relations -boek, wat sê: 'In die oorvloedige kommunistiese geskrifte van daardie tydperk is daar baie min oor die toekomstige kommunistiese buitelandse beleid buite die hoop dat 'n verenigde kommunistiese gemenebes uit inter-kapitalistiese wêreldoorloë kan ontstaan ​​” (Mazour 132). Juis daarom is kommunisme 'n baie belangrike konsep om die Domino -teorie te verstaan.

Daar was ook 'n rewolusie en dit het die tsaar ’'s buite bewind gekry en Lenin aan bewind, net soos Hitler in Duitsland. Dit was die begin van die kommunisme in die Sowjetunie. Die Sowjetunie was die komende 70 jaar 'n kommunistiese bedreiging vir die res van die wêreld. Die gebeurtenis waarvoor ek vroeër verklaar het dat die Domino-teorie genoem is, kommunisme in Suidoos-Asië, het in die 1950's ’s-1970 ’s plaasgevind. In albei gevalle ondersteun China die aggressor. Die gevalle was Noord -Korea wat Suid -Korea aanval, en Noord -Viëtnam wat Suid -Viëtnam aanval. In beide gevalle het Amerika ingegryp met militêre optrede. Ons was egter nie die enigste land wat hierdie optrede as baie gevaarlik beskou het nie, Australië ook. In September 1954 het minister van verdediging, sir Philip McBride, gesê: Dit is van kardinale belang om die gaping tussen Australië en die huidige hoogwatermerk van die suidwaartse stroom van Kommunisme te handhaaf. As hierdie gaping kleiner word, sal die aard en omvang van die aanval op Australië toeneem namate die afstand verkort word. Ten slotte, as die vloed van kommunisme aan ons oewers sou kom, sou ons 'n ondraaglike verdedigingslas en 'n skaal van aanval in die gesig staar wat ons vermoë om alleen af ​​te weer, te bowe sou kom. Daar is dus elke rede strategies en ekonomies alle redes waarom Australië moet saamwerk om aggressiewe kommunisme binne sy huidige grense te hou en sy voortvloei te stuit. In April van dieselfde jaar het die premier van Australië, Robert Menzies, gesê: As kommunistiese magte weer op optrede kom en 'n groot oorlog ontstaan, hoe verder noord die verdedigingslinies getrek word, hoe beter vir die gemeenskappe van Viëtnam, en Laos, en Kambodja, en Thailand, en Birma, en Malaya, en die Filippyne, en Indonesië en al die res van ons wat die beheer oor ons eie toekoms wil behou en op ons eie manier regeer. Baie mense het gesê en sê nog steeds dat die konflik in Viëtnam 'n interne konflik of 'n burgeroorlog was, en dat die Verenigde State geen reg het om daar te wees nie. Ek glo dat die Verenigde State alle rede en reg in die wêreld gehad het om daar te wees. Daar is twee groot redes hiervoor, kommunisme en die Domino -teorie. Die Noord -Viëtnamese, oftewel die Viet Cong (Vietnamese kommuniste), onder leiding van Ho Chi Minh, was kommunisties. Hulle word van artillerie en ammunisie voorsien deur die Sowjet-Chinese kommunistiese blok. Gevang materiaal toon dat dit baie vervaardig is deur die Skoda Munitions Works in Tsjeggo -Slowakye en deur Rusland en Siberië vervoer is en daarna deur China na Vietnam gestuur is. Militêre voorrade vir die Kommunistiese leërs stroom teen 'n geleidelike toename in Vietnam. Na raming word 2 000 kommunistiese Chinese militêre en tegniese leiding verskaf. Hulle funksioneer saam met die magte van Ho Chi Minh in sleutelposte-in stafafdelings van die hoër bevel, op divisiesvlak en in gespesialiseerde eenhede. Soos daar in die aanhaling staan, het die twee grootste kommunistiese lande ooit die Viet Cong befonds en onderrig. As ons nie ingegryp het nie en die kommuniste daarin geslaag het, kon 'n aksie plaasgevind het wat tot 'n volledig kommunistiese Asië gelei het. Dit sou baie maklik en baie vinnig gebeur het net soos domino's omval. Toe ons uiteindelik vertrek, sterf duisende en miljoene mense as gevolg van die nie -hulp aan die Viet Cong. Die bewindhebbers in die Verenigde State was bang dat die kommunistiese teorieë 'n mate van weerstand kan bied teen hul pogings om die demokrasie uit te skakel wat so gereeld op die lande wat deur hulle gedwing word, afgedwing word.

Hierdie Domino -teorie is in wese die hele rede waarom die Verenigde State aan die Viëtnam -oorlog deelgeneem het. Dus, in uitbreiding, is hierdie Domino -teorie die rede waarom The Things They Carried geskryf is en bied dus 'n agtergrond oor die algemeen ongewenste betrokkenheid by hierdie oorlog. O ’Brien toon baie van hierdie ongemak in die hoofstuk “On the Rainy River ”. Gedurende die hele lengte van hierdie hoofstuk het hy met homself baklei oor die idee om oorlog toe te gaan. Dit was oor die algemeen iets wat elke persoon wat na Viëtnam gegaan het, ervaar het, aangesien baie mense nie die rede daarvoor kon sien nie. Domino Theory bied 'n agtergrond vir die Amerikaanse betrokkenheid by die Viëtnam -oorlog en toon waarom die deelnemers moontlik daarteen gekant was.

“Domino -teorie (internasionale betrekkinge) — Britannica Online Encyclopedia. ” Encyclopedia – Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Februarie 2011.

Mazour, Anatole. Mans en nasies: 'n Wêreldgeskiedenis. 2de uitg. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 1971.

Winkler, Allan. Die Koue Oorlog: 'n geskiedenis in dokumente. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000

Domino Theory, 'n komplekse en interessante teorie, is gebaseer op 'n eenvoudige fisiese reël. Die reël is traagheid. Traagheid is die neiging van materie om in rus te bly of in 'n vaste rigting voort te gaan, tensy dit deur 'n mate van buite beïnvloed word. 'N Voorbeeld vir Domino Theory sou wees om 'n reeks domino's te maak en dan die eerste domino om te druk, terwyl elke domino val, sal 'n ander volg totdat elke domino uiteindelik val.

Namate die proses voortgaan, sal die domino's momentum kry. Hierdie analogie toon aan wat met die politieke samestelling van 'n spesifieke geografiese gebied kan gebeur as een van die dominante politieke denkpatrone versprei word. Die dominante politieke denkpatroon wat oorspronklik tot hierdie teorie gelei het, was kommunisme. Dit wil sê dat as een land in 'n streek 'n bepaalde tipe regering beoefen, dit buurlande kan beïnvloed om hierdie tipe regering aan te neem. Alhoewel die proses agter Domino Theory tegnies sedert die aanbreek van die mensdom plaasgevind het, is dit tot 1954 nie deur die destydse president Dwight D. Eisenhower deur 'n spesifieke titel geklassifiseer nie. Eisenhower het hierdie teorie gebruik om te verduidelik wat volgens hom 'n uitstekende verspreiding van kommunisme in Suidoos-Asië was. Hy het gesê dat jy 'n ry domino's opgestel het, jy slaan die eerste een om, en wat met die laaste een sal gebeur, is dat dit baie vinnig sal val. Hy het geglo, soos baie ander destyds, dat as een land in Suidoos-Asië onder die kommunisme val, sou die omliggende lande een vir een val. Hy was diep ontsteld oor die manier waarop die kommunisme Oos -Europa ná die Tweede Wêreldoorlog aangeneem het en die manier waarop Asië so maklik deur Japan oorgeneem is. Deur hierdie vrees het hy die potensiaal gesien vir 'n herhaling van die geskiedenis in Suidoos-Asië gedurende die laat 50's tot die 70's. 'N Sekere situasie waarop die Domino -teorie toegepas kan word, is die toename in mag van die Sowjetunie van 1917 tot die 1980's. Die Sowjetunie het gedurende hierdie tydperk die mag gekry deur grond of hele lande met geweld onder ander regerings uit te neem. Hierdie situasie het nie net die Domino -teorie ondersteun nie, maar het ook 'n sosialistiese neiging tot wêreldoorheersing getoon. Die tekens van hierdie neiging kan op baie plekke gevind word, insluitend Nations and Men, 'n International Politics and Relations -boek, wat sê: 'In die oorvloedige kommunistiese geskrifte van daardie tydperk word baie min gevind oor toekomstige kommunistiese buitelandse beleid buite die hoop dat 'n verenigde kommunistiese gemenebes uit inter-kapitalistiese wêreldoorloë kan ontstaan ​​” (Mazour 132). Juis daarom is kommunisme 'n baie belangrike konsep om die Domino -teorie te verstaan.

Daar was ook 'n rewolusie en dit het die tsaar ’'s uit die bewind gekry en Lenin aan bewind, net soos Hitler in Duitsland. Dit was die begin van die kommunisme in die Sowjetunie. Die Sowjetunie was die komende 70 jaar 'n kommunistiese bedreiging vir die res van die wêreld. Die gebeurtenis waarvoor ek vroeër verklaar het dat die Domino-teorie genoem is, kommunisme in Suidoos-Asië, het in die 1950's ’s-1970 ’s plaasgevind. In albei gevalle ondersteun China die aggressor. Die gevalle was Noord -Korea wat Suid -Korea aanval, en Noord -Viëtnam wat Suid -Viëtnam aanval. In beide gevalle het Amerika ingegryp met militêre optrede. Ons was egter nie die enigste land wat hierdie optrede as baie gevaarlik beskou het nie, Australië ook. In September 1954 het minister van verdediging, sir Philip McBride, gesê: Dit is van kardinale belang om die gaping tussen Australië en die huidige hoogwatermerk van die suidwaartse stroom van Kommunisme te handhaaf. As hierdie gaping kleiner word, sal die aard en omvang van die aanval op Australië toeneem namate die afstand verkort word. Ten slotte, as die vloed van die kommunisme aan ons oewers sou kom, sou ons 'n ondraaglike verdedigingslas en 'n skaal van aanval in die gesig staar wat ons vermoë om alleen af ​​te weer, te bowe sou kom. Daar is dus elke rede strategies en ekonomies alle rede waarom Australië moet saamwerk om aggressiewe kommunisme binne sy huidige grense te hou en sy voortvloei te stuit. In April van dieselfde jaar het die premier van Australië, Robert Menzies, gesê: As kommunistiese magte weer op optrede kom en 'n groot oorlog ontstaan, hoe verder noord die verdedigingslinies getrek word, hoe beter vir die gemeenskappe van Viëtnam, en Laos, en Kambodja, en Thailand, en Birma, en Malaya, en die Filippyne, en Indonesië en al die res van ons wat die beheer oor ons eie toekoms wil behou en op ons eie manier regeer. Baie mense het gesê en sê vandag nog dat die konflik in Viëtnam 'n interne konflik of 'n burgeroorlog was, en dat die Verenigde State geen reg het om daar te wees nie. Ek glo dat die Verenigde State alle rede en reg in die wêreld gehad het om daar te wees. Daar is twee groot redes hiervoor, kommunisme en die Domino -teorie. Die Noord -Viëtnamese, oftewel die Viet Cong (Vietnamese kommuniste), onder leiding van Ho Chi Minh, was kommunisties. Hulle word van artillerie en ammunisie voorsien deur die Sowjet-Chinese kommunistiese blok. Gevang materiaal toon dat dit baie vervaardig is deur die Skoda Munitions Works in Tsjeggo -Slowakye en deur Rusland en Siberië vervoer is en daarna deur China na Viëtnam gestuur is. Militêre voorrade vir die Kommunistiese leërs stroom teen 'n geleidelike toename in Vietnam. Na raming word 2 000 kommunistiese Chinese militêre en tegniese leiding verskaf. Hulle funksioneer saam met die magte van Ho Chi Minh in sleutelposisies-in stafafdelings van die hoër bevel, op afdelingsvlak en in gespesialiseerde eenhede. Soos daar in die aanhaling staan, het die twee grootste kommunistiese lande ooit die Viet Cong befonds en onderrig. As ons nie ingegryp het nie en die kommuniste daarin geslaag het, kon 'n aksie plaasgevind het wat tot 'n volledig kommunistiese Asië gelei het. Dit sou baie maklik en baie vinnig gebeur het net soos domino's omval. Toe ons uiteindelik vertrek, sterf duisende en miljoene mense as gevolg van die nie -hulp aan die Viet Cong. Die bewindhebbers in die Verenigde State was bang dat die kommunistiese teorieë 'n mate van weerstand kan bied teen hul pogings om die demokrasie uit te skakel wat so gereeld op die lande wat deur hulle gedwing word, afgedwing word.

Hierdie Domino -teorie is in wese die hele rede waarom die Verenigde State aan die Viëtnam -oorlog deelgeneem het. Dus, in uitbreiding, is hierdie Domino -teorie die rede waarom The Things They Carried geskryf is en bied dus 'n agtergrond oor die algemeen ongewenste betrokkenheid by hierdie oorlog. O ’Brien toon baie van hierdie ongemak in die hoofstuk “On the Rainy River ”. Gedurende die hele lengte van hierdie hoofstuk het hy met homself baklei oor die idee om oorlog toe te gaan. Dit was oor die algemeen iets wat elke persoon wat na Viëtnam gegaan het, ervaar het, aangesien baie mense nie die rede daarvoor kon sien nie. Domino Theory bied 'n agtergrond vir die Amerikaanse betrokkenheid by die Viëtnam -oorlog en toon waarom die deelnemers moontlik daarteen gekant was.

“Domino -teorie (internasionale betrekkinge) — Britannica Online Encyclopedia. ” Encyclopedia – Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Februarie 2011.

Mazour, Anatole. Mans en nasies: 'n Wêreldgeskiedenis. 2de uitg. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 1971.

Winkler, Allan. Die Koue Oorlog: 'n geskiedenis in dokumente. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000

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Domino's in Europese styl is tradisioneel gemaak van been, silwer lip oseaan pêrel oester dop (pêrelmoer), ivoor, of 'n donker hardehout soos ebbehout, met kontrasterende swart of wit pitte (ingelê of geverf). Sommige stelle het die boonste helfte dikte in MOP, ivoor of been, en die onderste helfte is in ebbehout. Alternatiewelik is domino -stelle gemaak van baie verskillende natuurlike materiale: klip (bv. Marmer, graniet of speksteen) ander hout (bv. As, eikebome, rooihout en sederhout) metale (bv. Koper of tin) keramiek klei, of selfs matglas of kristal. Hierdie stelle het 'n meer nuwerwets voorkoms, en die gewig wat dikwels swaarder is, laat hulle ook aansienliker voel; sulke materiale en die gevolglike produkte is gewoonlik baie duurder as polimeer materiale.

Moderne kommersiële domino -stelle word gewoonlik gemaak van sintetiese materiale, soos ABS of polistireenplastiek, of bakeliet en ander fenolhars, en baie stelle benader die voorkoms en gevoel van ivoor, terwyl ander gekleurde of selfs deurskynende plastiek gebruik om 'n meer kontemporêre voorkoms te verkry. Moderne stelle gebruik ook gewoonlik 'n ander kleur vir die kolletjies van elke verskillende eindwaarde (een kolle kan swart pitte hê, terwyl twee kolle groen, drie rooi, ens.) Kan wees om bypassende punte te vind. Soms vind u 'n domino -stel gemaak van karton soos dié vir speelkaarte. Sulke stelle is lig, kompak en goedkoop, en soortgelyke kaarte is meer vatbaar vir geringe versteurings, soos 'n skielike windjie. Soms het die teëls 'n metaalpen (in die middel 'n draai- of draaipunt genoem). [6]

Die tradisionele domino-stel bevat een unieke stuk vir elke moontlike kombinasie van twee ente met nul tot ses kolle, en staan ​​bekend as 'n dubbelses-stel omdat die stuk met die hoogste waarde ses pitte aan elke kant het (die "dubbele ses"). Die kolle van een tot ses word gewoonlik op seskantige dobbelstene gerangskik, maar omdat leë punte sonder kolle gebruik word, is sewe vlakke moontlik, wat 28 unieke stukke in 'n dubbel-ses stel moontlik maak.

Dit is egter 'n relatief klein getal, veral as u met meer as vier mense speel, so baie domino -stelle word "uitgebrei" deur eindes met 'n groter aantal plekke bekend te stel, wat die aantal unieke kombinasies van ente en dus stukke verhoog. Elke geleidelik groter stel verhoog die maksimum aantal pitte aan 'n punt met drie, dus die algemene uitgebreide stelle is dubbel-nege (55 teëls), dubbel-12 (91 teëls), dubbel-15 (136 teëls) en dubbel-18 (190 teëls), wat in die praktyk die maksimum is. Groter stelle soos dubbel-21 (253 teëls) kan teoreties bestaan, maar dit blyk uiters skaars te wees as dit nie bestaan ​​nie, aangesien dit veel meer sou wees as wat normaalweg nodig is vir die meeste dominospeletjies, selfs met agt spelers. Namate die stel groter word, word dit moeiliker om die aantal pitte op elke domino te identifiseer, daarom gebruik sommige groot domino -stelle meer leesbare Arabiese syfers in plaas van pitte. [7]

Die oudste bevestigde skriftelike vermelding van domino's in China kom uit die Voormalige geleenthede in Wulin (dit wil sê die hoofstad Hangzhou) geskryf deur die Yuan -dinastie (1271–1368) skrywer Zhou Mi (1232–1298), wat die lys papie (dobbelplate of teëls), sowel as dobbelstene as items wat deur smouse verkoop word tydens die bewind van keiser Xiaozong van Song (r. 1162–1189). [1] Andrew Lo beweer dat Zhou Mi domino's bedoel het as hy verwys papie, aangesien die Ming -skrywer Lu Rong (1436–1494) eksplisiet gedefinieer is papie as domino's (met betrekking tot 'n verhaal van 'n vryer wat 'n meisie se hand gewen het deur vier oorwinnings uit te haal papie uit 'n stel). [1]

Die vroegste bekende handleiding wat oor domino's geskryf is, is die 《宣 和 牌 譜》 (Handleiding van die Xuanhe -tydperk) geskryf deur Qu You (1341–1437), [1], maar sommige Chinese geleerdes meen dat hierdie handleiding 'n vervalsing van 'n latere tyd is. [8]

In die Ensiklopedie van 'n magdom skatte, Beskryf Zhang Pu (1602–1641) die spel om domino's uit te lê as papie, hoewel die karakter vir pu verander het, maar tog dieselfde uitspraak behou het. [1] Tradisionele Chinese dominospeletjies sluit in Tien Gow, Pai Gow, Che Deng, en ander. Die 32-delige Chinese domino-stel, gemaak om elke moontlike gesig van twee gegooide dobbelstene voor te stel en dus geen leë gesigte het nie, verskil van die 28-delige domino-stel wat in die middel van die 18de eeu in die Weste gevind is. [9] Chinese domino's met leë gesigte was gedurende die 17de eeu bekend. [10]

Baie verskillende domino -stelle word al eeue lank in verskillende dele van die wêreld gebruik om 'n verskeidenheid dominospeletjies te speel. Elke domino verteenwoordig oorspronklik een van die 21 resultate van die gooi van twee seskantige dobbelstene (2d6). Die een helfte van elke domino is ingestel met die pitte van die een dobbelsteen en die ander helfte bevat die pitte van die tweede dobbelsteen. Chinese stelle stel ook duplikate van sommige gooi bekend en verdeel die teëls in twee pakke: militêr en burgerlik. [11] Chinese domino's is ook langer as tipies Europese.

In die vroeë 18de eeu verskyn die "domino -spel" in Europa, wat eers in Italië verskyn, voordat dit vinnig na Oostenryk, Suid -Duitsland en Frankryk versprei het. Uit Frankryk is die spel teen die laat 1700's aan Engeland bekendgestel, [a] na bewering Franse krygsgevangenes ingebring. [14] Dit verskyn in die Amerikaanse literatuur teen die 1860's en variante spring gou op. In 1889 word dit beskryf as wêreldwyd versprei, "maar nêrens is dit meer gewild as in die kafees van Frankryk en België nie. [15] Van die begin af was die Europese spel anders as die Chinese. Europese domino -stelle bevat nie die militêre-burgerlike onderskeid tussen Chinese domino's en ook nie die duplikate wat daarmee gepaard gegaan het nie. Boonop is dit volgens Dummett in die Chinese speletjies slegs die identiteit van die teël wat van belang is. 'n stel van 28 unieke teëls bevat sewe bykomende stukke, waarvan ses die waardes verteenwoordig wat voortspruit uit die gooi van 'n enkele dobbelsteen met die ander helfte van die teël leeg en die sewende domino wat die leeg-leë (0-0) kombinasie verteenwoordig. 45-stuk (dubbele agt) stelle verskyn in Oostenryk, en die afgelope tyd is 55-stuk (dubbel nege) en 91-stuk (dubbel twaalf) stelle vervaardig.

Die vroegste spelreëls in Europa beskryf 'n eenvoudige blokspel vir twee of vier spelers. Latere Franse reëls voeg die variant van Domino à la Pêche ("Fishing Domino"), 'n vroeë gelykopwedstryd sowel as 'n driehandige wedstryd met 'n swembad. [17] Die eerste telling wat aangeteken is, was Fives, All Fives of Cribbage Dominoes, wat in 1863 verskyn het en die kenmerke van telling vir kombinasies sowel as die cribbage -bord geleen het uit die kaartspel van Cribbage. In 1864, Die Amerikaanse Hoyle beskryf drie nuwe variante: Muggins, eenvoudig Fives met die toevoeging van nog 'n Cribbage -funksie, die 'muggins rule' Bergen en Rounce langs die Block Game en Draw Game. [18] Almal word vandag nog gespeel saam met wedstryde wat die afgelope 60 jaar opgeduik het, soos Five Up, Mexican Train en Chicken Foot, die laaste twee wat voordeel trek uit die groter beskikbare domino -stelle. [19]

Domino's (ook bekend as bene, kaarte, mans, stukke of teëls) is gewoonlik twee keer so lank as wat hulle wyd is, wat dit makliker maak om stukke na gebruik weer te stapel. 'N Domino bevat gewoonlik 'n lyn in die middel om dit visueel in twee vierkante te verdeel, ook genoem eindes. Die waarde van weerskante is die aantal kolle of pitte. In die mees algemene variant (dubbel-ses) wissel die waardes van ses pitte tot niks of leeg. [20] Die som van die twee waardes, dit wil sê die totale aantal pitte, kan na verwys word as die rang of gewig van 'n teël kan 'n teël beskryf word as 'swaarder' as 'n 'ligter' een met minder (of geen) pitte.

Teëls is oor die algemeen vernoem na hul twee waardes. Die volgende is byvoorbeeld beskrywings van 'n teël met die waardes twee en vyf:

'N Teël met dieselfde pitwaarde aan elke kant word a genoem dubbel, en word tipies na verwys as dubbel-nul, dubbel-een, ensovoorts. [20] Omgekeerd word 'n teël met verskillende waardes a genoem enkellopend. [21]

Elke teël met 'n gegewe nommer is lid van die pak van daardie getal. 'N Enkele teël is 'n lid van twee pakke: 0-3 behoort byvoorbeeld beide aan die pak van drie en aan die pak met spasies, of 0 aan.

In sommige weergawes kan die dubbelspel as 'n bykomende tweepersoonskamer beskou word. In hierdie weergawes behoort die dubbelses tot beide die sesse en die tweeledige. Die oorheersende benadering is egter dat elke dubbele slegs tot een pak behoort. [20]

Die mees algemene domino -stelle wat in die handel beskikbaar is, is dubbel ses (met 28 teëls) en dubbele nege (met 55 teëls). Groter stelle bestaan ​​en is gewild vir speletjies met verskeie spelers of vir spelers wat op soek is na lang domino -speletjies.

Die aantal teëls in 'n dubbel-n stel volg die volgende formule: [22]

Die totale aantal pitte in 'n dubbel-n stel word gevind deur:

bv. 'n 6-6 stel het (7 x 8) / 2 = 56/2 = 28 teëls, die gemiddelde aantal pitte per teël is 6 (reeks is van 0 tot 12), wat 'n totale piptelling van 6 x 28 = 168 gee

Die gewildste spel is uitlegspeletjies, wat in twee hoofkategorieë verdeel word: blokkeringspeletjies en doelpunte.

  • Die meeste dominospeletjies is blokkeer -speletjies, dit wil sê die doel is om 'n mens se hand leeg te maak terwyl hy die teenstander blokkeer. Uiteindelik kan 'n telling bepaal word deur die pitte in die hande van die verloor spelers te tel.
  • In puntewedstryde is die telling anders en vind dit meestal tydens spel plaas, wat dit die hoofdoelwit maak. [21]
  • 'N Gewilde weergawe wat hoofsaaklik in Singapoer gespeel word, wat Hector's Rules genoem word, maak voorsiening vir dubbele teëls op die hande van die teenstanders en gee 'n bonusspel van 'n ekstra teël onmiddellik nadat hy 'n dubbele teël gespeel het.
  • As 'n teenstander al sy teëls op sy beurt lê, is die wedstryd gelykop.

Blokspeletjie wysig

Die mees basiese domino-variant is vir twee spelers en benodig 'n dubbel-ses stel. Die 28 teëls word met die gesig na onder geskommel en vorm die voorraad of boneyard. Elke speler trek sewe teëls uit die voorraad. Sodra die spelers teëls begin teken, word hulle tipies op die rand voor die spelers geplaas, sodat elke speler hul eie teëls kan sien, maar niemand kan die waarde van ander spelers se teëls sien nie. Elke speler kan dus sien hoeveel teëls te alle tye tydens die spel in die teenstander se hande bly.

Een speler begin deur een van hul teëls neer te slaan (speel die eerste teël). Hierdie teël begin die spelreël, waarin die waardes van aangrensende pare teëlpunte moet ooreenstem. Die spelers brei afwisselend die spellyn uit met een teël aan een van sy twee ente as 'n speler nie 'n geldige teël kan plaas nie, hulle moet voortgaan om teëls uit die voorraad te trek totdat hulle 'n teël kan plaas. Die spel eindig wanneer een speler wen deur sy laaste teël te speel, of wanneer die spel geblokkeer word omdat nie een van die spelers kan speel nie. As dit gebeur, ontvang elkeen wat die blok veroorsaak het al die oorblywende spelerpunte sonder om hul eie te tel. [20]

Puntespel Redigeer

Spelers verdien punte tydens die spel vir sekere konfigurasies, bewegings of om die hand leeg te maak. Die meeste doelpunte gebruik variasies van die trekking. As 'n speler nie 'domino' noem voordat die teël op die tafel gelê word nie, en 'n ander speler sê domino nadat die teël gelê is, moet die eerste speler 'n ekstra domino optel. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Teken spel wysig

In 'n gelykopwedstryd (blokkering of telling) word spelers ook toegelaat om soveel teëls as wat hulle wil uit die voorraad te trek voordat hulle 'n teël speel, en hulle mag nie slaag voordat die voorraad (amper) leeg is nie. [20] Die telling van 'n wedstryd is die aantal pitte in die hand van die verloor speler plus die aantal pitte in die voorraad. Die meeste reëls skryf voor dat twee teëls in die voorraad moet bly. [21] The draw game is often referred to as simply "dominoes". [23]

Adaptations of both games can accommodate more than two players, who may play individually or in teams. [20]

Line of play Edit

The line of play is the configuration of played tiles on the table. It starts with a single tile and typically grows in two opposite directions when players add matching tiles. In practice, players often play tiles at right angles when the line of play gets too close to the edge of the table.

The rules for the line of play often differ from one variant to another. In many rules, the doubles serve as spinners, i.e., they can be played on all four sides, causing the line of play to branch. Sometimes, the first tile is required to be a double, which serves as the only spinner. [21] In some games such as Chicken Foot, all sides of a spinner must be occupied before anybody is allowed to play elsewhere. Matador has unusual rules for matching. Bendomino uses curved tiles, so one side of the line of play (or both) may be blocked for geometrical reasons.

In Mexican Train and other train games, the game starts with a spinner from which various trains branch off. Most trains are owned by a player and in most situations players are allowed to extend only their own train.

Scoring Edit

In blocking games, scoring happens at the end of the game. After a player has emptied their hand, thereby winning the game for the team, the score consists of the total pip count of the losing team's hands. In some rules, the pip count of the remaining stock is added. If a game is blocked because no player can move, the winner is often determined by adding the pips in players' hands. [21]

In scoring games, each individual can potentially add to the score. For example, in Bergen, players score two points whenever they cause a configuration in which both open ends have the same value and three points if additionally one open end is formed by a double. [24] [25] In Muggins, players score by ensuring the total pip count of the open ends is a multiple of a certain number. In variants of Muggins, the line of play may branch due to spinners.

In British public houses and social clubs, a scoring version of "5s-and-3s" is used. The game is normally played in pairs (two against two) and is played as a series of "ends". In each "end", the objective is for players to attach a domino from their hand to one end of those already played so that the sum of the end tiles is divisible by five or three. One point is scored for each time five or three can be divided into the sum of the two tiles, i.e. four at one end and five at the other makes nine, which is divisible by three three times, resulting in three points. Double five at one end and five at the other makes 15, which is divisible by three five times (five points) and divisible by five three times (three points) for a total of eight points.

An "end" stops when one of the players is out, i.e., has played all of their tiles. In the event no player is able to empty their hand, then the player with the lowest domino left in hand is deemed to be out and scores one point. A game consists of any number of ends with points scored in the ends accumulating towards a total. The game ends when one of the pair's total score exceeds a set number of points. A running total score is often kept on a cribbage board. 5s-and-3s is played in a number of competitive leagues in the British Isles.

Card games using domino sets Edit

Apart from the usual blocking and scoring games, also domino games of a very different character are played, such as solitaire or trick-taking games. Most of these are adaptations of card games and were once popular in certain areas to circumvent religious proscriptions against playing cards. [26] A very simple example is a Concentration variant played with a double-six set two tiles are considered to match if their total pip count is 12.

A popular domino game in Texas is 42. The game is similar to the card game spades. It is played with four players paired into teams. Each player draws seven tiles, and the tiles are played into tricks. Each trick counts as one point, and any domino with a multiple of five dots counts toward the total of the hand. These 35 points of "five count" and seven tricks equals 42 points, hence the name.

Dominoes is played at a professional level, similar to poker. Numerous organisations and clubs of amateur domino players exist around the world. Some organizations organize international competitions.

Besides playing games, another use of domino tiles is the domino show, which involves standing them on end in long lines so that when the first tile is toppled, it topples the second, which topples the third, etc., resulting in all of the tiles falling. By analogy, the phenomenon of small events causing similar events leading to eventual catastrophe is called the domino effect.

Arrangements of millions of tiles have been made that have taken many minutes, even hours to fall. For large and elaborate arrangements, special blockages (also known as firebreaks) are employed at regular distances to prevent a premature toppling from undoing more than a section of the tiles while still being able to be removed without damage.

The phenomenon also has some theoretical relevance (amplifier, digital signal, information processing), [27] and this amounts to the theoretical possibility of building domino computers. [28] Dominoes are also commonly used as components in Rube Goldberg machines.

The Netherlands has hosted an annual domino-toppling exhibition called Domino Day since 1986. The event held on 18 November 2005 knocked over 4 million dominoes by a team from Weijers Domino Productions. On Domino Day 2008 (14 November 2008), the Weijers Domino Productions team attempted to set 10 records: [29]

  1. Longest domino spiral (200 m)
  2. Highest domino climb (12 m)
  3. Smallest domino tile (7 mm)
  4. Largest domino tile (4.8 m)
  5. Longest domino wall (16 m)
  6. Largest domino structure (25,000 tiles)
  7. Fastest topple of 30 metres of domino tiles (4.21 sec, time by Churandy Martina: 3.81 sec)
  8. Largest number of domino tiles resting on a single domino (1002 tiles) for more than 1 hour
  9. Largest rectangular level domino field (1 million tiles)
  10. A new record of 4,345,027 tiles [verduideliking nodig]

This record attempt was held in the WTC Expo hall in Leeuwarden. The artist who toppled the first stone was the Finnish acrobat Salima Peippo.

At one time, Pressman Toys manufactured a product called Domino Rally that contained tiles and mechanical devices for setting up toppling exhibits.

In Berlin on 9 November 2009, giant domino tiles were toppled in a 20th-anniversary commemoration of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Former Polish president and Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa set the toppling in motion.

A 2-1 tile is used in the logo of pizza retailer Domino's Pizza.

Since April 2008, [30] the character encoding standard Unicode includes characters that represent the double-six domino tiles. While a complete domino set has only 28 tiles, the Unicode set has "reversed" versions of the 21 tiles with different numbers on each end, a "back" image, and everything duplicated as horizontal and vertical orientations, for a total of 100 glyphs. Few fonts are known to support these glyphs. [31]


How the Domino Effect Has Shaped History

When younger generations hear the word ɽominoes,' they usually associate it with the famous board game, while others–especially food lovers–might connect it with a delicious pizza . For those who are more politically aware, the word probably brings thoughts of the Cold War and the threat of the spread of communism. In addition, most economists today love to use the word when referring to the debt crisis in the Eurozone.

The first time we meet the word historically, according to the Probert Encyclopaedia , it is connected to religious purposes:

"A domino is a kind of hood worn by the canons of a cathedral church. Later the name was given to a mourning-veil for women and later still to half-masks worn by women when travelling or at a masquerade, for disguise. A domino was a masquerade-dress worn for disguise by ladies and gentlemen, and consisting of an ample cloak or mantle with wide sleeves and a hood removable at pleasure. It was usually made of black silk, but sometimes of other colours and materials."

How exactly the widely-known board game that we meet in Italy during the 18th century connects to any of the above definitions, we don't know, but it's speculated that Italian missionaries who traveled to China probably saw a similar type of game and brought it back to Italy. Once in Italy, it mixed with local elements and the combination gave us what we know as dominoes today.

The domino effect, which usually takes place in that specific game, is of particular interest. It is a chain reaction (in linear order) caused when one small piece falls. This effect was the inspiration for former president of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, when he gave his famous "domino theory" speech on April 7, 1954,

Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So, you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

Most historians agree that the specific theory was firstly proposed by another American president, Harry S. Truman . Almost immediately after the end of WWII, the Cold War began. The idea that the conversion of a free, noncommunist nation into a communist state would trigger a chain reaction in neighboring countries became the official U.S. foreign policy at the time. For this reason, Truman sent military forces and aid to Greece and Turkey in order to prevent the expansion of communism into these countries from the increasingly communist Balkan states. The Domino Theory, or Effect as it is also known, was created in the late 1940s, but became widely known only a few years later with Eisenhower's speech in 1954.

It would reach its peak in the early 1960s when Eisenhower–who originally claimed that he would do almost anything to avoid turning his chair and country over to Kennedy–managed to convince him (Kennedy) about the disastrous effects that the domino theory could have for the U.S. and the western world as a whole. It was he who advised Kennedy that the "fall" of Laos to the communists-hence of Vietnam-would cause a chain reaction and the fall of the whole of Southeast Asia, something that would cause a serious security threat for the western world.

The specific theory, however, was proven in the aftermath of the Vietnam War to be incorrect as the alteration of Vietnam into a communist state did not cause a chain reaction or allow the communists to "conquer" the whole of Southeast Asia. While in the game, the fall of a single domino may cause a chain reaction, in reality, that political theory had failed miserably.

Despite the lessons learned from Vietnam, in the early 1980s, the domino theory was used again to justify the Reagan administration's interventions in Central America and the Caribbean. This time, people around the world were more politically aware and suspicious and openly challenged the American government's decisions by implying that the government was using the domino theory to hide other political and financial interests.

For many years after the Reagan administration, the use of the domino theory was restricted to the game—at least in the western world. However, it was used again during the Eurozone crisis in 2009. This time, it was used by the world's biggest banks and the governments of the world's most economically powerful nations. This crisis was preceded by the U.S. and European banking system predicament, which mutated into the debt storm that brought citizens of weaker Eurozone economies, such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, to the brink of bankruptcy.

During these crises, the governments of all the involved states tried to solve the problem by using memorandums and propping up failed entities, but recession after recession occurred across the globe, and unemployment and poverty rates exploded. The governments tried to justify the political economic policies by pointing out the high-risk of a chain reaction from one country's economy to another- a new domino theory, which could cause a global, systemic perfect storm of economic collapse.

Whether or not this is correct and whether the policies that have resulted are good or bad no doubt are topics that will have many books written on them in the coming years, and even after decades the full ramifications of the policies will likely not yet be fully known. Of course, the overarching idea here is to eventually fix the flawed system after applying the Band-Aid to stop the supposed Domino Effect. But even if there really would be a Domino Effect in this case and the policies ultimately work in the short term, humans tend to be reactionary. As the bleeding slows from the Band-Aid, we tend to get comfortable and forget about putting real effort into actually fixing what really caused the last downturn. Thus, stock crashes, oil crises, and other seemingly cyclical major economic catastrophes continue to happen over and over again, often for the exact same reasons as the times before.

Most people spend more time and energy going around problems than in trying to solve them.


Meer kommentaar:

Philip B. Plowe - 5/9/2007

"In foreign policy over the past century the Democrats have always been wrong, and the Republicans right."

It seems unlikely that a Republican president would have managed America's forces much differently before or during World War II.

And I'm sure that there are other examples, but one that immediately comes to mind is trading arms in exchange for hostages. Maybe it's just me, but that doesn't seem like very smart foreign policy.

Lawrence Brooks Hughes - 4/17/2007

The previous poster forgot the Vietnamese "boat people," of whom there were about 1.5 million, many of whom became American citizens and will be happy to tell you about it. Add to them the 2 million Cambodians clubbed to death, and you can make a humanitarian case that the U.S. should have stayed on--or at least should have not have cut off support for the South Vietnamese. How do we know Singapore would not have fallen to the communists if we had not drawn the line in Indo-China? We don't. The Asian economic "Tigers" do not include Vietnam, by the way. That's an economic backwater compared to Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore.
..It is a mistake to mix Eisenhower's name with our debacle in Vietnam, too. Eisenhower cleaned up the mess Truman left in Korea. It was Kennedy and Johnson who sent the U.S. troops to Vietnam, after Eisenhower declined to. Nixon merely inherited the bad situation created by Kennedy and LBJ and tried to extricate us with honor, but was sabotaged by the Democratic controlled Congress. In foreign policy over the past century the Democrats have always been wrong, and the Republicans right.

Joseph Smith - 4/16/2007

"Dominoes are back. The old, scuffed political theory of one domino falling and knocking down others turned up recently in President Bush's call for support from Congress for a surge in U.S. troops in Iraq."

And that is how the article started.


Yet another lovely article supporting our commander-in-chief, I thought. I certainly knew what this guy was out to prove. Yet another more-than-likely-futile attempt to convince me that everything Bush does is evil, that the Iraq War is evil, that America is evil, always was and always will be, and that we must surrender to the terrorists and retreat from Iraq…like… yesterday or something.

But I attempted to avoid the example of so many of my fiery liberal friends and read with an open mind.

First off, what is the domino theory? The phrase “domino theory” was coined by President Eisenhower. Describing the situation in the Vietnam area, he said, “You have a row of dominoes set up. You knock over the first one and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. . . you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.” Ok, so technically he never said, “DOMINO THEORY.” But he thought up the general idea.

Eisenhower supposedly thought this whole idea up in order to justify his invasion of Indochina. Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon also used the domino effect to rationalize the escalation of the Vietnam War. President Johnson said, “We have chosen to fight a limited war… in an attempt to prevent a larger war - a war almost certain to follow, I believe, if the Communists succeed in overrunning and taking over South Vietnam by aggression and by force.”

The author then goes on to show that this is exactly what President Bush is doing. When Bush said that, “If American forces were to step back from Baghdad before it is more secure, a contagion of violence could spill out across the entire country. In time, this violence could engulf the region. For the safety of the American people, we cannot allow this to happen,” he was essentially, the article claims, invoking the Domino Theory to convince people that it is vital to stay and finish the job we started.

The whole crux of the author’s argument is this: “The domino theory, however, contains inherent flaws. It conflates present or past events with projection into the future. More symbolic than analytical, it predicts that outcomes will be worse unless new actions are taken. This reinforces an argument for sustained or escalated military involvement.”

He brings up a random irrelevant point about how President Eisenhower said that if the first domino falls, the last will “certainly” fall, and at the same time said that it was a “possible” sequence of events. Then he shows how President Bush did the same thing by saying that the “contagion of violence could spill out,” while at the same time calling the war “decisive.”

Now to me, this shows that neither Eisenhower nor Bush was particularly sure of the reliability of the Domino Theory, or at least they, as presidents, were not willing to say something for absolute certain. HOWEVER. It does not, in any way, have anything to do with the effectiveness of the Domino Theory.

But that’s ok. We can just ignore that and move on to the author’s assertion that the Domino Theory failed in Vietnam. Sure, says Nichols, we took some beatings. “To be sure, America's departure from South Vietnam was horrific. U.S. allies there suffered terribly. So did the United States as a whole. Global prestige plummeted. A chastened America became less likely to engage in hot wars. Cambodia and Laos turned communist.”

Let me add to this that North Vietnam immediately reinvaded South Vietnam after the US left and instituted a Communist government there. This resulted in making the 58,209 Americans, 5,000 Japanese, 512 Australians, and 37 New Zealanders die for absolutely no reason. Then there are the 166,890 people who were wounded for absolutely no reason. And THEN there are the 5,635,300 Vietnamese causalities, all because America left without completing the job.

But that didn’t have much to do with the domino effect. So lets try this.

In addition to the aforementioned affects…

* North Vietnam invaded what is now Cambodia and killed as many as 2 million in the Kmer Rouge Genocide.
* Then the Vietnamese began to repress their Chinese citizens, forcing thousands to flee the country, and resulting in the Third Indochina War.


Despite all this, many still say that the Domino Effect did not occur. As the author states, “Nonetheless, the domino theory failed by the standard of its own predictions. Communism never took hold in Indonesia, Thailand, or more importantly, in any of the other large countries in the region, most notably, India. There was no cascade effect triggered by the U.S. departure from South Vietnam. The United States continued as an economic and military power. And now, America and Vietnam are trading partners, which President Bush should know as he visited that nation last year. Southeast Asia is a vibrant engine of global commerce and the region has closer ties to the United States now than at any time in the past.”

Why did Thailand and India not fall to communism? In fact, a very convincing argument can be made that they didn’t turn communist because of the war. The war bought enough time for these less developed countries to build up their economy and their government.

We can look at it from a different angle. Imagine that in World War II, America suddenly decides, just after D-Day, that the war is simply to costly, that too many people have died. After all, it's Europe! We have a huge ocean between us! And anyway this war is pointless. So then we set up a timetable and pull out of Europe.

What we are saying here is that, sure the rest of Europe would fall, but.

a) that is ok (“The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq is likely to have horrendous consequences on the ground… Yet when seen in a longer historical view, such an event might not be nearly as tragic as predicted.)

b) there would be no other consequences after that. Hitler will NOT take over the rest of the world. He will not proceed to conquer the rest of Asia after repelling the Soviet Union. He will NOT eventually take over the rest of the world either.

Obviously, not only is the Domino Theory plausible, it seems like common sense. Not all cases are as extreme as the World War II. But if we pull our troops out of Iraq now, there is absolutely nothing keeping a “contagion of violence” from spilling out into the region.

William J. Stepp - 4/9/2007

"Cambodia and Laos turned communist", as you note now they along with Vietnam are turning capitalist.

Bush should indeed put the dominoes
back in the box, and get back into his sandbox.


The United States plans an invasion of Japanese-occupied Korea in 1948 following the victory in Europe but before it is able to, the Soviet Union invades the area and backs a guerrilla group of Communists called the Jucheists. This event essentially sparks the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union. Following this, newly Communist China invades Japanese-occupied Vietnam to assist its allies in defeating Imperial Japan. This halts the US invasion of Vietnam and the Vietminh are able to take control of the entire country, leading to the "Domino Theory" that one country becoming communist leads to the surrounding countries to becoming communist to be proven correct, with Japan's fall to Communism occurring in 1950. In the 1970s, a group of Bengali communists known as the Tiger Force rise to power following a revolution that unites India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan into a Marxist-Maoist superstate.

In 1989, the Soviets are able to fight off Iranian-backed Mujahideen and dissolve the country of Afghanistan into the Union, but the Union eventually crumbles in 1995, a few years after the inevitable collapse of the Berlin Wall following further US involvement in Europe's affairs which caused decline in popularity of the Soviet government. The US neglects Guam in this period as it no longer becomes useful to fight a losing battle against Communists in Asia, and so it to falls to a Communist dictatorship.


World War II, Race, and the Southeast Asian Origins of the Domino Theory

Wen-Qing Ngoei deciphers how Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia and Euro-American attitudes about race shaped Eisenhower’s domino theory.

Above all else, Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia and Euro-American attitudes about race shaped Eisenhower’s domino theory

On April 7, 1954, US President Dwight Eisenhower used the image of “falling dominoes” to answer a reporter’s question about the “strategic importance of Indochina to the free world.”

Implying that Indochina stood at the head of a “row of dominoes,” Eisenhower explained that should communists “knock over the first one,” the last would “go over very quickly.” The following month, after the Vietnamese communists defeated French forces at Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower revisited his “theory of dominoes” at another journalist’s request, stating that the “free world” must not “write off” Indochina but instead “build that row of dominoes so that they can stand the fall of one.”

Whether US leaders’ uncritical belief in the domino theory led to America’s ill-fated war in Vietnam, or whether Washington used the theory merely to justify the expansion of US influence in Southeast Asia, scholars tend to agree that US decision-makers imposed the theory’s platitudes upon the region in willful ignorance of the unique internal dynamics of each Southeast Asian country.

Perhaps this explains why most studies of the domino logic have located its origins far from the very region to which Eisenhower first applied the analogy. One scholar has argued that the domino theory arose from President Woodrow Wilson’s determination to shape America’s global influence and its credibility in world opinion. Some see traces of the theory in the West’s appeasement of Hitler in 1938, which presumably emboldened the Nazi’s expansionist tendencies. Still others insist that the theory arose as US analysts watched the Soviet Union encroach upon Eastern Europe, Iran, Greece, and Turkey after 1945.

But why not look for the domino theory’s origins in Southeast Asia, in the allies’ war against Japan?

In effect, Southeast Asia’s capitulation to Japan pre-plotted the southward path of Eisenhower’s falling dominoes. Between 1940 and 1942, Japan co-opted the regimes of Thailand and Vichy-ruled Indochina, and then drove the remaining western powers from their colonies, one by one.

Beaten back by Japanese forces, Britain retreated rapidly from Malaya. When British officials surrendered Singapore in February 1942, Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared the loss of this “impregnable fortress” island the “darkest moment of the war.” Like dominoes, Indonesia and the Philippines went over to Japan very quickly. By mid-1942, Japan had strung the entire region together in interconnected insecurity. The formative domino logic arose from the colonial order’s stunning and rapid collapse.

Thereafter, the western allies invariably perceived the Cold War for Southeast Asia through the prism of Japan’s World War II victories. Well into the early 1950s, Britain’s defense policy envisioned an external aggressor (this time, communist-led China) toppling Vietnam and Thailand, then Malaya and Singapore in succession. British officials seeking US aid wanted their American ally to see “the Southeast Asian picture correctly,” and learned to their delight that the Americans held similar views. All through 1950, US fact-finding missions that President Harry Truman dispatched to Southeast Asia also concluded that China’s “enemy land forces” must reprise Japan’s “overland invasion of Malaya” like in the “last war.”

When US officials from these missions visited UK Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia Malcolm MacDonald in Malaya and Singapore, he encouraged them to see Indochina as the “highway to the rest of South East Asia.” If Indochina fell to the Chinese and the Vietnamese communists, MacDonald explained, Thailand “wouldn’t resist at all,” laying bare the rest of the region for conquest.

US records show that American officials needed no convincing. Their reports to Washington underscore that they, too, expected any Chinese “movement southward” to “practically annihilate” French forces in northern Indochina and precipitate the second coming of what Churchill had dubbed the “darkest moment of the war.”

Crucially, locating the origins of the domino logic within Southeast Asian history also illuminates the racial character of the theory that scholars have overlooked. Indeed, London and Washington feared that the ten million ethnic Chinese who lived in Southeast Asia would readily serve Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions and emulate the Japanese campaign. Western leaders had long suspected that Southeast Asia’s Chinese remained “racially, culturally and politically…bound to the mother country.”

Anglo-American anxieties intensified as Beijing began cultivating the Chinese of Indonesia, giving rhetorical (but little material) support to the guerrillas of the mostly Chinese Malayan Communist Party, and pouring communist propaganda into Singapore’s Chinese-language middle-schools. If Japan’s fifth columns in Southeast Asia had proven effective, millions of Chinese across the region promised only worse. The Eisenhower administration, to block Beijing’s influence, labored for years to have anticommunist Taiwan win over Malaya and Singapore’s Chinese.

Thus, when Eisenhower coined the domino theory, he was not so much invoking strategic lessons from far-flung regions of the world. Rather, he was re-inscribing western perceptions of Southeast Asia’s particular interconnected insecurity that had stood in plain sight since the Pacific War.

This essay is adapted from material in The Arc of Containment: Britain, Malaya, Singapore and the Rise of American Hegemony in Southeast Asia, 1941-1976 (Cornell University Press, forthcoming fall 2019) and “The Domino Logic of the Darkest Moment,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 21, no. 3 (2014).


Today in History: CIA Reject The Domino Theory (1964)

The Domino Theory was a very influential theory during the Cold War. It was to decisively influence American foreign policy during the 1960&rsquos and the 1970&rsquos. America was very concerned at the rapid expansion of Soviet influence in many areas of the world and the growing number of Communist revolutions around the world. The Domino Theory, that was developed by right-wing American intellectuals, stated that if one country fell to Communism, then this would lead to other countries in the surrounding region becoming communist.

AMERICAN SOLDIERS SEARCHING FOR COMMUNISTS (1966)

This theory was very influential during the American involvement in Vietnam. This theory stated that if South Vietnam fell to the communists, the rest of Southeast Asia would also fall &ldquolike dominoes,&rdquo and the theory had been used to warrant much of the American War effort in Vietnam. The theory greatly alarmed the Americans and this led them to commit hundreds of thousands of troops to prevent Communist North Vietnam from conquering South Vietnam. President Johnson was very much influenced by the Domino Theory in his handling of the situation in Vietnam.

B-52 BOMBER OVER VIETNAM


Modernity and Power

Modernity and Power provides a fresh conceptual overview of twentieth-century United States foreign policy, from the Roosevelt and Taft administrations through the presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson. Beginning with Woodrow Wilson, American leaders gradually abandoned the idea of international relations as a game of geopolitical interplays, basing their diplomacy instead on a symbolic opposition between "world public opinion" and the forces of destruction and chaos. Frank Ninkovich provocatively links this policy shift to the rise of a distinctly modernist view of history.

To emphasize the central role of symbolism and ideological assumptions in twentieth-century American statesmanship, Ninkovich focuses on the domino theory—a theory that departed radically from classic principles of political realism by sanctioning intervention in world regions with few financial or geographic claims on the national interest. Ninkovich insightfully traces the development of this global strategy from its first appearance early in the century through the Vietnam war.


Meer kommentaar:

Philip B. Plowe - 5/9/2007

"In foreign policy over the past century the Democrats have always been wrong, and the Republicans right."

It seems unlikely that a Republican president would have managed America's forces much differently before or during World War II.

And I'm sure that there are other examples, but one that immediately comes to mind is trading arms in exchange for hostages. Maybe it's just me, but that doesn't seem like very smart foreign policy.

Lawrence Brooks Hughes - 4/17/2007

The previous poster forgot the Vietnamese "boat people," of whom there were about 1.5 million, many of whom became American citizens and will be happy to tell you about it. Add to them the 2 million Cambodians clubbed to death, and you can make a humanitarian case that the U.S. should have stayed on--or at least should have not have cut off support for the South Vietnamese. How do we know Singapore would not have fallen to the communists if we had not drawn the line in Indo-China? We don't. The Asian economic "Tigers" do not include Vietnam, by the way. That's an economic backwater compared to Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore.
..It is a mistake to mix Eisenhower's name with our debacle in Vietnam, too. Eisenhower cleaned up the mess Truman left in Korea. It was Kennedy and Johnson who sent the U.S. troops to Vietnam, after Eisenhower declined to. Nixon merely inherited the bad situation created by Kennedy and LBJ and tried to extricate us with honor, but was sabotaged by the Democratic controlled Congress. In foreign policy over the past century the Democrats have always been wrong, and the Republicans right.

Joseph Smith - 4/16/2007

"Dominoes are back. The old, scuffed political theory of one domino falling and knocking down others turned up recently in President Bush's call for support from Congress for a surge in U.S. troops in Iraq."

And that is how the article started.


Yet another lovely article supporting our commander-in-chief, I thought. I certainly knew what this guy was out to prove. Yet another more-than-likely-futile attempt to convince me that everything Bush does is evil, that the Iraq War is evil, that America is evil, always was and always will be, and that we must surrender to the terrorists and retreat from Iraq…like… yesterday or something.

But I attempted to avoid the example of so many of my fiery liberal friends and read with an open mind.

First off, what is the domino theory? The phrase “domino theory” was coined by President Eisenhower. Describing the situation in the Vietnam area, he said, “You have a row of dominoes set up. You knock over the first one and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. . . you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.” Ok, so technically he never said, “DOMINO THEORY.” But he thought up the general idea.

Eisenhower supposedly thought this whole idea up in order to justify his invasion of Indochina. Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon also used the domino effect to rationalize the escalation of the Vietnam War. President Johnson said, “We have chosen to fight a limited war… in an attempt to prevent a larger war - a war almost certain to follow, I believe, if the Communists succeed in overrunning and taking over South Vietnam by aggression and by force.”

The author then goes on to show that this is exactly what President Bush is doing. When Bush said that, “If American forces were to step back from Baghdad before it is more secure, a contagion of violence could spill out across the entire country. In time, this violence could engulf the region. For the safety of the American people, we cannot allow this to happen,” he was essentially, the article claims, invoking the Domino Theory to convince people that it is vital to stay and finish the job we started.

The whole crux of the author’s argument is this: “The domino theory, however, contains inherent flaws. It conflates present or past events with projection into the future. More symbolic than analytical, it predicts that outcomes will be worse unless new actions are taken. This reinforces an argument for sustained or escalated military involvement.”

He brings up a random irrelevant point about how President Eisenhower said that if the first domino falls, the last will “certainly” fall, and at the same time said that it was a “possible” sequence of events. Then he shows how President Bush did the same thing by saying that the “contagion of violence could spill out,” while at the same time calling the war “decisive.”

Now to me, this shows that neither Eisenhower nor Bush was particularly sure of the reliability of the Domino Theory, or at least they, as presidents, were not willing to say something for absolute certain. HOWEVER. It does not, in any way, have anything to do with the effectiveness of the Domino Theory.

But that’s ok. We can just ignore that and move on to the author’s assertion that the Domino Theory failed in Vietnam. Sure, says Nichols, we took some beatings. “To be sure, America's departure from South Vietnam was horrific. U.S. allies there suffered terribly. So did the United States as a whole. Global prestige plummeted. A chastened America became less likely to engage in hot wars. Cambodia and Laos turned communist.”

Let me add to this that North Vietnam immediately reinvaded South Vietnam after the US left and instituted a Communist government there. This resulted in making the 58,209 Americans, 5,000 Japanese, 512 Australians, and 37 New Zealanders die for absolutely no reason. Then there are the 166,890 people who were wounded for absolutely no reason. And THEN there are the 5,635,300 Vietnamese causalities, all because America left without completing the job.

But that didn’t have much to do with the domino effect. So lets try this.

In addition to the aforementioned affects…

* North Vietnam invaded what is now Cambodia and killed as many as 2 million in the Kmer Rouge Genocide.
* Then the Vietnamese began to repress their Chinese citizens, forcing thousands to flee the country, and resulting in the Third Indochina War.


Despite all this, many still say that the Domino Effect did not occur. As the author states, “Nonetheless, the domino theory failed by the standard of its own predictions. Communism never took hold in Indonesia, Thailand, or more importantly, in any of the other large countries in the region, most notably, India. There was no cascade effect triggered by the U.S. departure from South Vietnam. The United States continued as an economic and military power. And now, America and Vietnam are trading partners, which President Bush should know as he visited that nation last year. Southeast Asia is a vibrant engine of global commerce and the region has closer ties to the United States now than at any time in the past.”

Why did Thailand and India not fall to communism? In fact, a very convincing argument can be made that they didn’t turn communist because of the war. The war bought enough time for these less developed countries to build up their economy and their government.

We can look at it from a different angle. Imagine that in World War II, America suddenly decides, just after D-Day, that the war is simply to costly, that too many people have died. After all, it's Europe! We have a huge ocean between us! And anyway this war is pointless. So then we set up a timetable and pull out of Europe.

What we are saying here is that, sure the rest of Europe would fall, but.

a) that is ok (“The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq is likely to have horrendous consequences on the ground… Yet when seen in a longer historical view, such an event might not be nearly as tragic as predicted.)

b) there would be no other consequences after that. Hitler will NOT take over the rest of the world. He will not proceed to conquer the rest of Asia after repelling the Soviet Union. He will NOT eventually take over the rest of the world either.

Obviously, not only is the Domino Theory plausible, it seems like common sense. Not all cases are as extreme as the World War II. But if we pull our troops out of Iraq now, there is absolutely nothing keeping a “contagion of violence” from spilling out into the region.

William J. Stepp - 4/9/2007

"Cambodia and Laos turned communist", as you note now they along with Vietnam are turning capitalist.

Bush should indeed put the dominoes
back in the box, and get back into his sandbox.


Kyk die video: Как играть в домино? Правила игры, тонкости игры в домино.